I. INTRODUCTION
I n this paper we analyze the effect of property tax limitations on state and local revenue during economic recessions. We argue that the changes to revenue policy precipitated by property tax limits cause short-term instability during fi scal crises. Our work continues a string of research that argues that fi scal limitations often have unintended secondary and tertiary consequences. Instead of cutting the size of government, scholars have shown that public offi cials almost always fi nd ways to circumvent the spirit of most taxing, spending, and defi cit limitations (Kiewiet and Szakaty, 1996; Gerber et al., 2001; Kousser, McCubbins, and Moule, 2008) . For example, if a limit only restricts property taxes, a locality might switch to revenues derived from charges and fees or sales taxes. Likewise, if a revenue limit only restricts state revenues, a hike in property tax collections at the local level might ensue. These techniques, while increasing govern-ment size, allow public offi cials to abide by the letter of the law. This paper analyzes the tertiary consequences of these actions.
Despite these known tactics, the complaints of politicians regarding the bite of voter proscribed revenue limitations are especially shrill during recessions. We consider the hypothesis that tax caps lead to greater short-term declines in revenue during recessions than would otherwise occur in the absence of these caps. We posit that property tax limits and the politics of circumvention that they engender have a tertiary effect, aggravating the effects of public economic crises. Specifi cally, we argue that tax revolt legislation has led state and local governments to rely on sources of revenue that are increasingly elastic with respect to changes in personal income. These new revenue sources are less stable during recessions than the previous mainstay of state and local government revenue, the property tax. As a result, state and local revenues are more pro-cyclical, as they grow quickly during economic booms and crash during recessions.
This paper tests the hypothesis that property tax limits aggravate revenue declines during fi scal crises by analyzing time-series, cross-sectional data for the U.S. states. During the time frame analyzed in this paper, all 50 states experience multiple economic declines. For the purposes of our test it is especially useful that the states do not suffer downturns at the same time and are not subject to property tax limits at the same time. This wide array of variation allows us to estimate the interaction effect between property tax limits and recessions. Our results support the hypothesis that property tax limits aggravate revenue declines in state and local governments during recessions. This suggests that states would have fewer and more modest fi nancial problems during economic downturns if they did not enact tax limitations. This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe our data. In Section III we review the previous literature with respect to the consequences of property tax limits on government revenue streams. In Section IV we show that property tax limits lead to increases in income taxes and the assessments of charges and fees. In Section V we tie these consequences with what is known about revenue stability during fi scal downturns from the public fi nance literature. In particular, we show that state income taxes, charges and fees have a relatively high income-elasticity. In Section VI we present a model of the effect of property tax limits, recessions, and their interaction. In so doing, we conclude that property tax limits aggravate revenue declines during recessions. In Section VII we summarize our conclusions.
II. DATA
We start by describing the data used in all statistical analyses in this paper. Our key independent (i.e., treatment) variable is an indicator for the presence of a property tax limit (see Table 1 ). The following rules were used to determine the existence of a property tax limit. First, the limit must restrict property taxes for all geographic areas of the state (no local options). Second, if the limit does not restrict all taxing entities (e.g., it only limits municipalities but not special districts), then constrained taxing entities must collect a majority of the state's property taxes. Third, the limit must be either a revenue limit (pegging increases in total property tax revenues to an explicit rule) or it must stipulate both a tax rate limit and cap the growth of assessed property values simultaneously. This last rule means that states that have assessment limits but not tax rate limits are excluded from consideration. The tax limit indicator is coded as one in a fi scal year if a state has an active property tax limit and zero otherwise. Note that several states have repealed their tax limits over our time series.
We collected a variety of covariates that are commonly used in the state and local fi nance literature to control for other factors that affect revenue collections. Specifically, we control for three measures of population fl uctuation: total population, elderly population (defi ned by the number of individuals over the age of 65), and school-age population (this group was approximated using the age category 5-19). Each of these variables was collected from annual estimates of statewide residents by the Census Bureau. We also control for state political characteristics using a set of dummy variables Lowry, 1994, 2000) . For modeling purposes, divided government is omitted and used as the reference group for the two other dummy variables. Finally, we control for state personal income and statewide total employment to hold constant changes in the economy. 1 Descriptive statistics for these variables and others appear in Table 2 .
Another variable used in some of our analysis is a measure of state recessions. Our data come from Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) . These authors produce data that measure the number of quarters per calendar year that each of the fi fty states should be classifi ed as being in recession between fi scal years 1980-2001. We use these data to create an annual indicator of state recessions. Specifi cally, we classify a state as being in recession if at least three quarters of its fi scal year have a recession probability greater than 0.5. from expansion to contraction of the economy. This model estimates when the mean growth rate switches between high and low growth regimes. 3 This estimation procedure produces recession probabilities, ranging from zero to one that represent the probability that a state is in a recession in a given quarter. In this paper we rely on a simple cutoff method to identify whether or not a quarter can be classifi ed as recessionary. If the recession probability is greater than 0.5 during any given quarter, a state is coded as being in recession for that quarter. This cut-off rule is non-controversial as Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) report that recession probabilities are regularly either close to zero or close to one.
Finally, the dependent variables in all of our analysis are measures of state and local fi scal behavior. We rely on data from the Commerce Department's publication of Annual State and Local Government Finances, http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/ historical_data.html. The variables included in our analysis are state and local general own-sources revenues, income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, and charges and fees. The exact specifi cation of each of these variables will be detailed in the discussions of research design that precede all statistical analyses.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPERTY TAX LIMITS ON GOVERNMENT REVENUES
In this section we review previous fi ndings on the secondary consequences of property tax limits. Before the tax revolt even ended, newspaper columnists and policy experts immediately identifi ed ways in which property tax limitations would change government fi scal structure. Since then, empirical tests have confi rmed many of these speculations (Danziger and Ring, 1982; Joyce and Mullins, 1991; Mullins and Joyce, 1996; Kousser, McCubbins, and Moule, 2008) . Specifi cally, property tax limits increase a state's reliance on charges and fees, sales taxes, income taxes, and the use of off-budget activities (Bennet and DiLorenzo, 1982; Schwartz, 1997; Thompson and Green, 2004) .
A signifi cant conclusion of the previous literature is that property tax limits lead to increases in income and sales taxes. Specifi cally, Thompson and Green (2004) show that Oregon's property tax limit prompted the state to rely more heavily on income taxes. Skidmore (1999) , using data from all 50 states, shows that local government restrictions lead to growth in state aid to local governments. This is clearly the case in Massachusetts. Increases in state aid occurred immediately after the adoption of their property tax limit, Proposition 2 ½. Though this increase was initially sustained by a 3 The underlying data used to calculate recession probabilities are based on a state-level coincident index by Crone (2002) . Crone's widely used index follows the methodology developed by Stock and Watson (1989) for the national economy. Crone uses three monthly and one quarterly economic indicators to estimate the underlying state of the economy. These indicators are nonagricultural payroll employment, unemployment rate, average hours worked in manufacturing, and real wage and salary disbursements. These data are preferable to other economic indicators because they display substantial business cycle variability (unlike personal income) and are available on a quarterly basis (unlike gross state product) for each state.
strong economy, the so-called "Massachusetts Miracle," the state was later forced to raise the fl at rate personal income tax to sustain high levels of state aid. By contrast, increases in the use of the sales taxes were evident in California. Several scholars have argued that localities have been turned into "sales-tax farms," affecting redevelopment, zoning, and eminent domain, and favoring car dealerships and signifi cant shopping malls over mom-and-pop businesses. This activity even garnered a name, the "fi scalization of land use" (Schwartz, 1997; Lewis, 2001) .
There is also strong evidence that property tax limits increase assessments of charges and fees. Charges and fees are assessed in a variety of forms: increases in college tuition, business licenses and fees, charges for school lunches, park fees, impact fees, or costs associated with public parking. Many property tax bills today are now loaded with "special assessments" in lieu of ad valorem property taxes (Kogan and McCubbins, 2009) .
Sometimes, the assessment of charges and fees instead of property taxes is a simple case of substitution: water bills that were once subsidized by local government property taxes are now paid for in full directly by the user in the form of standby charges or sewerage fees (Moule, 2010) . Alternatively, charges and fees can also be a consequence of changes to the structure of government. Previous research suggests that property tax limits splinter government revenue sources. Instead of classic budgetary procedures where the whole of government spending is allocated from general revenue sources, property tax limits led to the creation of special funds and devolve fi nances to newly formed special districts or enterprises. Bennet and DiLorenzo's (1982) early work on this subject posited that property tax limits led to a "massive amount of off-budget spending and borrowing." In particular, Bennet and DiLorenzo were concerned with the proliferation of "off-budget enterprises," the political entities referred to as authorities, districts, commissions, or agencies. Most recently, Bowler and Donovan (2004) found that property tax limits were the cause of special district formation, at least in states that heavily used the initiative process. Special districts and the like, given their purpose of service delivery, are likely to rely on user fees instead of traditional taxes.
To bolster and systemize this evidence, we conduct our own test of whether or not property tax limits increase reliance on sales taxes, income taxes, and charges and fees. We rely on a differences-in-differences model (Wooldridge, 2006) to estimate the effect of property tax limits on the relative usage of each revenue stream. This model allows us to hold constant unobserved, time-invariant state-level characteristics that predict state and local revenues. Additionally, this model controls for variation of the dependent variable related only to the passage of time that is constant across all states.
Our dependent variables are constructed as the specifi c revenue stream (charges and fees, sales taxes, income taxes, and property taxes) as a proportion of general ownsource revenues. Because the errors across these equations are likely to be correlated, we employ a seemingly unrelated regression model (Zellner, 1962) . This model shows statistically signifi cant negative correlation in the error terms between each revenue source, as one would expect when these taxes are substitutes for each other.
Measuring these variables as a proportion of general revenues relieves some of the pernicious autocorrelation that often plagues analysis of fi scal outcomes in differences-in-differences analysis (Bertrand, Dufl o, and Mullainathan, 2004) . As an added precaution, however, we present results for a limited subset of data. Specifi cally, the analysis that follows only includes data for every fi fth year starting in 1977. This method is preferable to fi rst differencing, another effective way of removing serial correlation, in this instance because we are able to retain our dependent variable in levels, as opposed to changes. Our hypothesis predicts that property tax limits will affect the level of reliance on each revenue stream. Using every fi fth year of data only slightly attenuates the signifi cance of our fi ndings.
We regress our dependent variables on an indicator for property tax limits as well as an array of covariates and state and year fi xed effects. Our model is estimated by:
where: y = fi scal outcome as a proprtion of general, own-source revenues Τ = indicator for a property tax limit θ = covariates κ = year fi xed effects a = state fi xed effects.
The results of our estimation are displayed in Table 3 . Each continuous covariate (total employment, personal income, and all population variables) is transformed to represent the effect of a million-unit change. As is clear from the table, however, the covariates generally do a poor job of predicting reliance on each type of revenue stream, with the noticeable exception of the property tax.
As predicted the indicator for the presence of a property tax limit has noticeable effects on revenue choices. As intended, the adoption of a property tax limit decreases reliance on property taxes as a proportion of general revenues. Specifi cally, the adoption of a property tax limit is associated with approximately a 1.66 percentage point reduction of property taxes relative to general own-source revenues. In contrast, the adoption of a property tax limit is associated with increased reliance on both income taxes as well as the assessment of charges and fees (although the latter is not signifi cant at conventional levels of confi dence). Cumulatively, there is perfect substitution between declines in property taxes and increases in income taxes and charges and fees, as the latter increase 1.73 percentage points cumulatively. Finally, contrary to the previous literature, we fi nd no statistically signifi cant relationship between property tax limits and the sales tax in this model. Figure 1 supports the statistical results. This fi gure presents four graphs, each showing average reliance on each revenue source fi ve years before and fi ve years after states implement property tax limits. States where data are not available for this full time-span are excluded (Maine, Wisconsin, Idaho, Oregon, Utah), as are states that never adopt limits. The vertical line in each fi gure represents the implementation of the limit. These fi gures show descriptively that property tax limits are associated with decreased reliance on property taxes and increased reliance on charges and fees and to a lesser extent on income taxes. Again, there is no clear relationship between property tax limits and reliance on sales taxes.
Interestingly, the effect of property tax limits appears to occur shortly before the offi cial implementation of the limit. This may mean that lawmakers change revenue policy in anticipation of TEL implementation, perhaps at the time when the limit is adopted. Another possibility is that the early changes in revenue policy are refl ections of other events that are correlated with the adoption of property tax limits. This possibility led Kousser, McCubbins, and Moule (2008) to conclude that TELs, by themselves, are not responsible for the declines in total state own-source revenue. For example, state legislatures commonly adopt property tax cuts or change assessment practices in an attempt to preempt the passage of limits at the ballot box. Regardless of the exact timing, it is clear that property tax limits are signifi cantly associated with changes to 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 . Alaska is excluded. Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 0.10 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***) levels.
Figure 1
Reliance on Revenue Sources, Before and After Property Tax Implementation revenue policy. In the next section, we more thoroughly explain the implication of this phenomenon during fi scal downturns, which has the effect of turning fi nancial molehills into mountains.
IV. ESTIMATING SHORT-RUN REVENUE STABILITY
We argue in this paper that shifts in revenue streams associated with property tax limitations have had deleterious affects on state fi nancial health during recessions. Our conclusion is drawn from a literature in public fi nance that tells us that many of the new revenue sources that states rely on to replace lost property tax revenue are incomeelastic. Research in public fi nance shows that income-elastic revenues lead to larger revenue growth in the long-run but are less stable in the short-run during a fi scal crisis.
The most comprehensive examination of short-term revenue instability during fi scal crises is by Holcombe and Sobel (1997) . The authors present an error-correction model of tax elasticity. Elasticity refers to the responsiveness of revenues to changes in personal income. They fi nd that corporate income taxes, personal income taxes, and non-food retail sales taxes are income-elastic whereas taxes on fuel usage and liquor sales are income-inelastic. Although they do not formally test the elasticity of property taxes (which is generally a local, not state revenue source), they characterize this revenue as "... relatively stable over the business cycle" (Holcombe and Sobel, 1997, p. 186 ). Looking at state-level data, Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) found that short-run income elasticity was greater for income taxes than for sales taxes.
An omission in the literature is the absence of analysis on the elasticity of charges and fees. Charges and fees are now the largest single revenue source for state and local governments in many states (McCubbins and Moule, 2009) . In this paper we replicate the aforementioned results on the income-elasticity of tax revenue sources, and present new results on the income-elasticity of charges and fees and property taxes.
We rely on the method described by Holcombe and Sobel (1997) to estimate the short-run income-elasticity of state and local revenue sources. 4 This dataset includes a breakdown of state and local revenues into sales taxes, personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, property taxes, and other revenue sources, nationwide. This last category includes motor vehicle license taxes, other taxes, charges and fees, and miscellaneous revenues. All variables are transformed to constant dollars using the consumer price index.
Optimally, to estimate income elasticity it is best to have data on tax bases, not tax revenues. As explained by Holcombe and Sobel, elasticity estimates will be biased if policy decisions to raise or lower taxes are correlated with economic changes. Though this is a consideration in our analysis, Holcombe and Sobel's own estimates show that there is a strong correlation between estimates derived from tax bases and tax revenues. Further, it would be diffi cult, if not impossible, to estimate the "tax base" from which charges and fees are drawn. Accordingly, we follow previous analysis, including Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) , and estimate the income elasticity of actual revenues. Holcombe and Sobel (1997) develop an error correction model to estimate short-run income elasticity described by (2) Δln(R t ) = α + β 1 Δln(I t ) + β 2 (E t-1 ) + ε where R t is the time-series of a revenue component, I t is the time-series of state personal income, and E t is a variable used for error-correction. As described by Holcombe and Sobel, error correction is necessary in the estimation of short-run elasticity because, "Two non-stationary variables that have a long-run relationship with one another will tend to move back together whenever they get too far apart (a regression to their mean relationship). Thus one may observe one variable moving down in the same period another is moving up simply because the variables deviated from the levels implied by their long-run relationship" (Holcombe and Sobel, 1997, p. 83) . Here, the error correction variable is the lagged residual derived from an estimate of long-run elasticity (as discussed by Holcombe and Sobel, 1997) . Table 4 presents the short-run income-elasticity estimates of the major components of state and local revenue. These coeffi cients represent the percentage change in the revenue component associated with a one percent change in state personal income. The results largely confi rm the analysis by Holcombe and Sobel. Corporate income tax revenue has the highest-elasticity, varying by 2.83 percentage points for every one percent Table 4 An Error Corection Model of Short-Run Income Elasticity, 1963 -2005 Revenue change in total state personal income. This result is graphed in Figure 2 . Changes in corporate income tax revenues follow roughly, and magnify nearly three-fold, changes in personal income. The results for personal income taxes are very similar, with an income-elasticity of 2.17. Table 4 also shows that receipts from "other" sources, largely charges and fees, have an income-elasticity greater than one. Again, this level of elasticity means that this revenue source will fl uctuate more than the general economy. The income-elasticity of charges and fees is not surprising given what we know about consumer behavior during recessions. As the most recent Census data shows, recessions stop consumers from getting married, moving, immigrating, and a variety of other behaviors associated with government fees for services. Revenues from impact fees and charges paid by real-estate developers for development projects certainly slow or can even cease during downturns. If citizens are not paying as much charges and fees during recessions, revenues will go down even when costs for the government are fi xed. The elasticity of charges and fees is graphed against income in Figure 3 . Again, as supported by the regression data, this revenue source matches and magnifi es changes in the economy.
We also confi rmed through this analysis that property tax revenues are highly incomeinelastic. Of the fi ve revenue sources analyzed herein, property taxes are the only Corporate Income Tax  Personal Income 1985 1995 2005 Changes in Natural Logs source of revenue that is not signifi cantly predicted by changes in personal income. Figure 4 plots the change in log state and local property tax revenue with the change in log personal income. As evident from the fi gure, property tax revenues often appear almost counter-cyclical. The important lesson from this analysis is that some revenues will be more stable than others during times of fi scal crisis. Although the most recent fi scal crisis was precipitated by falling home prices, historically property values are stable during downturns. Moving away from property taxes to more elastic forms of revenue, such as charges and fees or income taxes, could make states more susceptible to cyclical volatility. This danger was recognized by Holcombe and Sobel who noted that, "If the trend away from local reliance on property taxes continues, however, local governments may not be as insulated from recessionary fi scal crisis in the future" (Holcombe and Sobel, 1997, p. 51) .
The consequence of increased income-elasticity after adoption of a property tax limit is particularly clear in the case of Oregon. Although Oregon offi cially had a binding property tax limit in place at the beginning of our time series (it passed a levy-limit of 106 percent growth starting in 1916), Oregon passed additional limitations in 1990 Oregon passed additional limitations in , 1996 Oregon passed additional limitations in , and 1997 Oregon passed additional limitations in (the 1996 limit was never implemented). The change in revenue policy before and after 1990 has particularly noticeable implications for income elasticity. Changes in Natural Logs
Prior to 1990, Oregon had a levy-based system of calculating property taxes. Local governments passed a budget and deducted the amount of state aid from the total. The remaining revenue requirement would determine that year's property tax rate. The anti-cyclical behavior of this system, as noted by Thompson and Green (2004) , is that the level of tax burden from year to year was highly dependent on state aid. As noted by Thompson and Green (2004) , "... fl uctuations in state school aid were not random; the state legislature tended to increase funding during economic upswings and cut it during recessions, thereby exacerbating the local property tax's bite" (Thompson and Green, 2004, p. 75) . The adoption of the 1990 property tax limit eliminated the property tax as a revenue safety net during recessions. Oregon's revenues have become far more income-elastic following the adoption of this limit (Thompson and Green, 2004) .
V. PROPERTY TAX LIMITS AND RECESSIONS
We turn now to our central analysis, the effect of property tax limits during recessions. In this section we test whether property tax limits aggravate revenue declines during fi scal downturns. We rely on indicators from Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) for statewide Personal Income Property Taxes Changes in Natural Logs recessions. The Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) data are a signifi cant improvement over previous research that simply relied on national-level recession data. As shown by Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) , there is tremendous variation between states regarding business cycles. This fi nding is not surprising given the diverse economies of the fi fty states. Using these data we are able to take advantage of the rich variation in state business cycles to produce accurate estimates of their effects.
We estimate the effect of property tax limits, recessions, and their interactions on state and local general, own-source revenue using differences-in-differences. As previously mentioned, this model holds constant trends common to states over time as well as unobserved, time-invariant state-level characteristics. We do, of course, sweep many of the requirements for the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), such as unconfoundedness, under the rug, however. We estimate the following equation: All continuous variables are log-transformed and fi rst-differenced. This specifi cation is common with econometric data, particularly in the study of short-term effects of fi scal crises. First-differencing is particularly helpful in eliminating autocorrelation. However, because the Breuch-Pagan Test for residual autocorelation was affi rmative, we also employ a lag dependent variable, as suggested by Beck and Katz (2009) . Removing serial correlation is important to our analysis because, as noted by Bertrand, Dufl o, and Mullainathan (2004) , serial correlation often causes one to underestimate standard errors in differences-in-differences estimation leading to mistaken rejection of the null hypothesis. Indeed, from a series of simulations, those authors found effects "signifi cant at the 5 percent level for up to 45 percent of the placebo interventions" (Bertrand, Dufl o, and Mullainathan, 2004, p. 1) .
The coeffi cients of our model are interpreted as effects on state and local general, own-source revenue growth rates. The results are presented in Table 5 . We present two models of our results, the second excluding the continuous economic variables as they are highly correlated with the recession indicators. Here we report the results for the fi rst model. We fi nd that both elderly and school-age population variables are insig-nifi cant, but that that a one percentage point change in total population leads to a 2.1 percentage change in the growth of general, own-source revenues. Unifi ed Republican and Democratic control of state government has the expected, although only weaklysignifi cant effects on revenue growth, increasing growth during unifi ed Democratic control and decreasing growth during unifi ed Republican control. The inclusion of economic variables in model 2 has negligible effects on these fi ndings.
The most important independent variables in this model are the effects of tax limits, recessions, and the interaction of the two variables on revenue growth rates. The results suggest that property tax limits, in absence of a recession, have no effect on general revenue growth. This fi nding replicates the fi ndings in our previous research (Kousser, Table 5 The Eff ect of Recession and Tax Limits on Revenue McCubbins, and Moule, 2008) . However, new to this paper is the fi nding that property tax limits do in fact have signifi cant effects on revenue during recessions. 5 The interaction variable suggests that in the presence of a recession, a tax limit would decrease state and local own-source general revenue by an additional 0.3 percent. This result is signifi cant at the 5 percent level. This decline should be interpreted cumulatively with the overall effect of recessions, which adds an additional 1.2 percent decline in revenue. States that enact property tax limitations fare much worse than states without limits during recessions. Given likely heterogeneity of the effectiveness of property tax limits, these results are likely underestimate the effect of these limits.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that property tax limits have negative effects on state and local revenues during fi scal crises. Property limits cause states to rely on incomeelastic revenue sources, such as the income tax or charges and fees. The consequence of this substitution is apparent from how these revenues are differentially affected by the economy. For many years, property taxes were a highly inelastic form of revenue, a source of stability in the face of personal income declines. Greater reliance on an income-elastic revenue source will result in greater revenue declines during economic downturns. This was shown in the negative and signifi cant interaction effect between the recession indicator and property tax limits.
Our results suggest that states, in response to tax limits, are builidng a revenue system that puts them on a budgetary roller coaster with huge swings between the apex of the coaster's climb and the nadir of its fall, as it seems unlikely that politicians will choose to limit spending during the good times, and thus far attempts to adopt strict Rainy Day Funds have been limited.
Scholars of the origin of California's Proposition 13 have identifi ed highly progressive, and thus income-elastic, state income taxes as an immediate cause of the property tax limit. The economic boom of the late 1970s prompted high taxes and large surpluses. Paradoxically, as this paper has shown, the passage of the property tax limit only aggravates the problem of elastic revenues. It is ironic that heavier reliance on income-elastic revenues will, in the long-term, have the opposite effect of the tax reformer's intentions. In the long term, income-elastic revenue sources grow at rates higher than the economy itself. This means that it is plausible that property tax limits have actually set the course for higher growth of government.
